主   题：Patient Violence and the Provision of Medical Services

主讲人：赵昕

摘   要：“Defensive medicine” is seen as one of the major drivers of high health expenditure. In this paper, we study economic and non-economic events that may lead to changes in supplier behavior of medical professionals. Specifically, we examine how physicians in a large hospital in China respond to medical disputes and settlement payments as well as news reports on patient violence. In particular we study the event of a murder of a physician where the perpetrator blamed his surgeon for refusing to operate on him and thus causing great suffering. Administrative records on internet search history confirm that this incident led to a drastic increase in the volume of media coverage and public attention on patient-physician relationship immediately after the event. This event, taking place in a different city from the location of the hospital we study, led to an increase in defensive medicine including the number of operations. The health outcomes have deteriorated, indicating that this non-economic incentive dramatically changed supplier behavior without any health benefit. We provide evidence for similar cases and compare these behavior changes to reports on medical misconduct settlements at the hospital.

关于主讲人：赵昕，博士毕业于美国科罗拉多大学博尔德分校经济系，现任对外经济贸易大学国际经济贸易学院经济系助理教授。主要研究领域包括健康经济学，产业经济学，应用微观经济学。曾在Journal of Health Economics等发表论文。同时担任International Journal of Industrial Organization的审稿人和国家自然科学基金青年项目的主持人。

时 间：2017年11月8日星期三12:10-13:20

地 点：学术会堂南楼608室

主办单位：人力资本与劳动经济研究中心