主讲人： 刘兴飞

摘   要：Does introducing or abolishing a policy measure affect the eligible individuals in the same way - just with opposite signs or are the reform effects of moving to a more or less generous policy symmetric? This is an important question that standard program evaluation results cannot answer and policy designers may thus implicitly assume symmetry of the effects. To address this issue, it is necessary to have access to a specific policy shock, which preferably implies both positive and negative news to the target group. In this paper, we try to answer the proposed policy evaluation question with opposite signs by exploring a large-scale quasi-experiment in unemployment insurance with imperfectly informed UI claimers: Job seekers are confronted with either an upgrade or a downgrade of their benefit eligibility within their unemployment spell, without being initially fully informed about the change. They face, however, exactly the same size of treatment: an increase or decrease of the potential benefit duration (PBD) by 200 days. We first compare the treatment effects of these update cases with the reference case, in which individuals are fully informed about their PBD. We identify the treatment effect around the threshold of age 25 where PBD rules change in the Swiss UI system.

关于主讲人：刘兴飞，2012年毕业于瑞尔森大学（Ryerson University），现在康考迪亚大学（Concordia University）执教，他的研究领域包括：劳动经济，实用计量经济，人力资本的积累，移民，以及政策评估。

时 间：2016年5月26日星期四16:00-17:20

地 点：学术会堂南楼608室

主办单位：人力资本与劳动经济研究中心