Title: An experimental study of partnership formation in social networks
Abstract: This paper reports on laboratory experiments on the formation of partnerships in social networks. Agents randomly request favors and turn to their neighbors to form a partnership where they commit to provide the favor when requested. The formation of a partnership is modeled as a sequential game, which admits a unique subgame perfect equilibrium resulting in the formation of the maximum number of partnerships. Experimental results show that a large fraction of the subjects (75%) play according to their subgame perfect equilibrium strategy and reveals that the efficient maximum matching is formed over 78% of the times. When subjects deviate from their best responses, they accept to form partnerships too early. The incentive to accept when it is optimal to reject is positively correlated with subjects' risk aversion, and players employ simple heuristics like the presence of a captive partner to decide whether they should accept or reject the formation of a partnership.
主讲人介绍：朱敏，北京师范大学经济与工商管理学院副教授。本科及硕士毕业于北京师范大学经济与工商管理学院，博士毕业于法国里昂第二大学。美国密歇根大学、芝加哥大学访问学者。主要研究方向包括行为与实验经济学、教育经济学、市场设计、社会网络等。研究成果发表于Ethics & Behavior，Games and Economic Behavior, China Economic Review等国际期刊，以及《教育经济评论》等中文期刊。