Title: Patient Violence and the Provision of Medical Service

Speaker: Xin Zhao
Abstract: “Defensive medicine” is seen as one of the major drivers of high health expenditure. In this paper, we study economic and non-economic events that may lead to changes in supplier behavior of medical professionals. Specifically, we examine how physicians in a large hospital in China respond to medical disputes and settlement payments as well as news reports on patient violence. In particular we study the event of a murder of a physician where the perpetrator blamed his surgeon for refusing to operate on him and thus causing great suffering. Administrative records on internet search history confirm that this incident led to a drastic increase in the volume of media coverage and public attention on patient-physician relationship immediately after the event. This event, taking place in a different city from the location of the hospital we study, led to an increase in defensive medicine including the number of operations. The health outcomes have deteriorated, indicating that this non-economic incentive dramatically changed supplier behavior without any health benefit. We provide evidence for similar cases and compare these behavior changes to reports on medical misconduct settlements at the hospital.

About Xin Zhao: Xin Zhao is an assistant professor of the University of International Business and Economics. His research interests include Health Economics, Industrial Economics, Applied Microeconomics.

Date: November 8, 2017

Time: 12:10-13:20 PM

Location: Room 608, Academic Hall, CUFE